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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Three issues are raised by this position. First, whether the Court of Appeals has 
departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings1 by holding a jury 
instruction regarding the tax consequences of a personal injury judgment to be error but 
failing to remand the case to correct such error. Second, whether the Court of Appeals 
in deciding an important question of state common law2 erred in excluding expert 
testimony which embraced an ultimate question of fact. Finally, whether the Court of 
Appeals erred in upholding the Trial Court's admission into evidence statements 
contained in a "demand or settlement letter" written by appellant in an early attempt to 
resolve the disputed claim. 
OFFICIAL OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The opinion issued by the Court of Appeals referred to herein is Case No. 
900461-CA, filed June 18, 1991. See Addendum. 
Please see Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 46(c). 
2Please see Utah Rules Appellate Procedure, Rule 46(d). 
1 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is a civil action for personal injury. Jurisdiction of the Trial Court is based 
on Utah Code Annotated Section 78-3-4(1) (1953 as amended). 
Jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court to hear this petition is based on Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 45 et. seq. 
Judgment of the Trial Court was entered on March 21, 1990. A Rule 59 Motion 
for New Trial was served on March 21, 1990 which was denied by a Memorandum 
Decision on May 10, 1990. Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal in response to this 
Memorandum Decision on May 23, 1990. Decision of the Appellate Court was entered 
on June 18, 1991. 
DETERMINATIVE RULES 
Utah rules of Appellate Procedure, Rules 45, 46 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 408 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 704 
(as set out verbatim in the addendum) 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On or about May 28, 1986, the appellant, Grant Davidson, was injured by a cow 
or steer that escaped from a wrecked truck driven by appellee, Erwin M. Prince, who 
was in the employment of appellee, Folkens Brothers Trucking. (R. 1-2). On November 
17, 1987, Davidson initiated suit in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, 
State of Utah. Judgment was entered on March 21, 1990, for Davidson and against the 
defendants in the sum of $27,323.88, plus interest. 
Davidson submits that three errors of law committed at the trial level prejudiced 
his rights and denied him a fair resolution of the action. To correct the three errors, on 
March 21, 1990, the appellant made a Motion for New Trial pursuant to Rule 59 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This motion was denied on May 10, 1990 in a 
Memorandum Decision setting out that if indeed the three errors had occurred, they were 
harmless errors and did not warrant a new trial. Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal in 
response to this Memorandum Decision on May 23, 1990. The Court of Appeals 
considered the matter and filed an opinion on June 18, 1991 denying appellant's request 
for a new trial. Appellant appeals this decision claiming the errors committed at the 
Trial Court level were indeed harmful and prejudicial, depriving the appellant a fair 
adjudication of the action. 
3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about May 28, 1986, the defendant/appellee, Erwin M. Prince, while 
acting in the course and scope of his employment for the appellee, Folkens Brothers 
Trucking, operated his motor vehicle at the location of approximately SF 15, in the curve 
from S.B. SF 15, in such a way so as to cause vehicle to overturn. (R. 1-2.). 
2. As a proximate result of the accident, various animals that were being shipped 
in his truck were released on the highways and surrounding areas. (R. 2.). 
3. Appellant was injured when an animal that had escaped from the appellee's 
vehicle attacked appellant. (R. 2.). 
4. Appellant retained counsel and filed suit against the appellees, Erwin M. 
Prince and Folkens Brothers Trucking, for personal injury. (R. 1.). 
5. During trial, expert opinion on the negligence of the defendants was excluded 
on the grounds that the question was an ultimate issue to be decided by the jury. (Partial 
Trial Transcript, Pages 22-23.). 
6. Portions of a letter from appellant to appellee were admitted as evidence 
supporting the defense counsel's emphasis on the distance between the animal and the 
appellant. (Partial Trial Transcript, Pages 47-48, 64-70, and 73-74.). 
7. The jury instructions contained information on the tax consequences of a 
personal injury judgment. (R. 225.). 
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8. The jury returned a verdict for the appellant. The jury found Grant Davidson 
40% negligent, Erwin Prince 60% negligent, and awarded Grant Davidson $27,323.88 
(60% of total award of $45,539.80), pre-judgment interest on special damages of 
$2,980.38 and post-judgment interest of 12% per annum. (R. 242-244.). 
9. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Trial Court's decision that expert opinion 
on the negligence of the appellees should be excluded on the grounds that the question 
was an ultimate issue to be decided by the jury. (Opinion of the Court of Appeals, 9.). 
10. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Trial Court in holding that evidence out 
of a letter made between appellant and appellees supporting the defense counsel's 
emphasis on the distance between the animal and the appellant was admissible. (Opinion 
of the Court of Appeals, 13.). 
11. The Court of Appeals reversed the Trial Court's ruling that the inclusion of 
the tax consequences of a personal injury judgment in jury instructions was not 
prejudicial, but it refused to grant a new trial because the "error was mitigated by the 
context in which the information was presented." (Opinion of the Court of Appeals, 7-
8.). 
5 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IT WAS 
IMPROPER FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO INSTRUCT THE JURY 
REGARDING THE TAX CONSEQUENCES OF A PERSONAL INJURY 
JUDGMENT BUT NEVERTHELESS FAILING TO CORRECT SUCH 
ERROR BY ORDERING A NEW TRIAL IN THIS MATTER. 
The Trial Court gave the following jury instruction (#34): 
When you have arrived at the amount of your verdict, should you 
determine that the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict, you must not add any sum of 
money to that amount for federal income taxes. 
I instruct you that it is the law that the amount, if any, awarded to the 
plaintiff by your verdict is not income to the plaintiff within the meaning of 
federal tax law. 
The Court of Appeals agreed with appellant that the Trial Court erred by giving 
a jury instruction regarding the tax consequences of a personal injury judgement. The 
Court announced its position by declaring: "[w]e, therefore, adopt the majority view that 
it is improper to instruct the jury as to the tax consequences of a personal injury or 
wrongful death award.M (Please see the Opinion of the Court of Appeals, page 7.). 
However, because the instruction had already been given, the court acknowledged 
that it now faced a different issue: whether the Trial Court committed reversible error 
by so instructing the jury. Rather surprisingly, the Court of Appeals determined that due 
to the context surrounding the issuance of the instruction, which was an admonishment 
to the jurors not to consider other collateral matters such as punishment or attorney fees 
6 
in making their determination of damages, the objectionable portion of the instruction 
was not likely to have affected the amount of damages awarded. Id. at 8. 
The Court of Appeals made this determination while simultaneously 
acknowledging that "the effect of such instructions on the jury's ultimate damage award 
is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine." Id. at 8. It is difficult to 
understand how the court could determine the effect the tax instructions had on the jury, 
when, in its own words, it "is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine [the 
outcome]." 
It is the appellant's contention that there is always a substantial risk of prejudicing 
the jury when tax consequences are admitted. The Appellate Court recognized this 
tendency when it espoused the majority position and cautioned the courts that an 
instruction as to the tax consequences of a judgment should not be given by trial judges. 
Id. at 8. 
The end purpose of the rule is to obviously to prevent juror prejudice, but it 
achieves its purpose by making it grounds for reversible error if a jury instruction is 
given that even tends to mislead the jury. Knapstad v. Smith's Management Corp.. 774 
P.2d 1, 3 (Utah App. 1989) (citations omitted). The reasoning is simple: because it is 
so difficult to determine prejudice after the instruction has already been given, the 
instruction should be stopped before it ever reaches the jurors in the first place. 
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What occurred at trial is exactly what the rule was designed to prevent ~ evidence 
that tends to mislead the jurors did in fact reach them. As appellant contended in his 
first appeal, and as the court in Knapstad has held, the mere admission of evidence with 
a tendency to mislead is reason enough to allow a new trial. Since the Court of Appeals 
knew of this tendency, which it outwardly acknowledged by cautioning the courts, it 
erred in not overturning the trial court. 
In the present case, the Plaintiff sought a significant amount of special damages 
in the form of medical bills and loss of wages, and sought general damages which would 
bring the total even higher. It is appellant's contention that the jury was unduly 
influenced and prejudiced by the instruction given them on taxes. Had this instruction 
not been given, the jury members would have had (1) a clearer case, unenshrouded by 
complicated matters to consider, and (2) an unprejudiced view as to the amount the 
Plaintiff was entitled to recover. 
Because evidence was entered that would tend to mislead the jurors, the decision 
of the Court of Appeals should be overturned and a new trial granted, where an unbiased 
jury can seriously consider and grant a fair and just amount of damages. 
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POINT II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE 
TRIAL COURT'S EXCLUSION OF APPELLANT'S 
EXPERT'S TESTIMONY CONCERNING APPELLEES 
NEGLIGENCE. 
During the presentation of appellant's case in chief, Mr. Newell Knight, an 
accident reconstruction expert, was called to testify of appellee's negligence. Counsel 
for appellant asked Mr. Knight if he had an opinion, in light of his training, skill, and 
experience, as well as his investigation into the accident, on whether or not the defendant 
was negligent. Mr. Knight stated that he had an opinion. When asked to express that 
opinion, counsel for the appellee objected on the grounds that the question embraced the 
ultimate issue to be decided by the jury. The court sustained the objection over the 
exception of appellant's counsel. The Court of Appeals later affirmed this decision. 
For many years an expert was not allowed to offer an opinion on the ultimate 
issue to be decided by the jury. However, that rule has long since fallen by the way 
side, first through appellate decisions and then through the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Rule 704 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides: 
Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not 
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of 
fact. 
See Shurtleffv. JavTuft&Co.. 622 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1980). 
Appellant maintains that the improper exclusion of this testimony was indeed 
prejudicial. The testimony of Mr. Knight involved elements of physics and other 
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sciences which can be extremely difficult for a lay person to grasp. While it is certainly 
possible that some jurors possess sufficient education and understanding to comprehend 
the expert's testimony in this regard, other jurors may have more difficulty in 
understanding the substance of the testimony. It is therefore necessary in order to 
present a proper case to all jurors that expert testimony provide not only its scientific 
basis, but its fundamental conclusion. It is to be noted in this case the jury was not 
unanimous on the issue of liability, and it is very probable that the restrictions placed 
upon appellant's counsel in presenting his case on all levels denied appellant the right to 
a fair trial on this issue. 
The Court of Appeals decision as presently written severely restricts the testimony 
of experts in civil cases. As stated, the rule will drastically alter the use of expert 
testimony in personal injury actions or other cases involving negligence or other legally 
cognizable breaches of duty. Appellant contends that in a society that is becoming 
increasingly complex in terms of technology and professional responsibilities, a broad 
interpretation of Rule 704 of the Utah Rules of Evidence in necessary in order to obtain 
a complete and fair hearing on complex factual issues at trial. Rule 704 itself, by its 
clear terms, recognizes the potential complexity of issues in civil cases, particularly 
causation and negligence or breach of other duties in allowing an expert to testify 
regarding his opinion even if it embraces the ultimate issue of fact. The Court of 
Appeals decision as written will severely limit potential expert opinions and as it stands 
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will bar much expert testimony in this state which would otherwise have been made 
available to jurors to assist in their fair resolution of the issues. 
Appellant believes that the court's position should be corrected and that in this 
particular case Mr. Knight should have been allowed to testify regarding the issue of 
negligence and the matter should be remanded for a new trial. 
POINT HI 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DISTRICT 
COURT'S ADMISSION OF STATEMENTS CONTAINED IN 
A SETTLEMENT DEMAND LETTER. 
In addition to appellant's claim of error concerning evidence which went to the 
question of appellee's negligence, appellant also believes that error occurred in relation 
to evidence which addressed appellee's claim of appellant's contributory negligence. 
Appellee's theory at trial was that the appellant was negligent in cornering the animal 
which had escaped from the appellee's truck and eventually caused the injury in question. 
In presenting his case, appellee's counsel placed great emphasis on the distance 
between appellant and the animal at the time the animal charged. Evidence was 
presented from the appellant's deposition that he estimated the distance to be 
approximately 40 feet. Further evidence was elicited at trial that the distance may have 
been approximately 22 feet. 
However, at trial appellee's counsel attempted and succeeded in introducing a 
statement from a letter of compromise written to the appellee wherein the distance was 
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estimated at 10 feet. This testimony obviously provided far greater support to appellee's 
theory that appellant had "cornered" the animal. 
Appellant's counsel objected to this testimony on the grounds that it was contained 
in a letter of settlement negotiation. The court overruled appellant's objection and 
allowed the statement to come in, and then went further to prohibit the remainder of the 
letter to be presented to the jury so that the context of the communication could be 
adequately understood. 
Appellant respectfully submits that this ruling was in error in light of Rule 408 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence. That Rule provides: 
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting 
or offering of promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or 
attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or 
amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its 
amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is 
likewise not admissible. This rule does not require the exclusion of any evidence 
otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of 
compromise negotiations. This rule also does not require exclusion when the 
evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a 
witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct 
a criminal investigation or prosecution, (emphasis added) 
An examination of the letter in question (addendum) shows that it is unmistakably 
a communication involving an offer of willingness to settle appellant's claim. The letter 
is a response to a letter written by appellees indicating that they were not liable for the 
accident. In his letter, appellant briefly gives a rough account of the facts of the 
accident. However, contrary to the Court of Appeal's assertion, the letter was not 
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"merely an attempt to inform appellee as to the facts of the incident." (Please see the 
Opinion of the Court of Appeals, page 13.). Rather, it was an offer to compromise and 
settle the claim. In fact, the last sentence of the letter reads: "You may speak with us 
directly or we can send it to lawyers and to court, you decide." (addendum). This 
statement is clearly an offer to settle the claim, which gave the defendants the option to 
either (1) settle the matter without outside help or, (2) to take it all the way to court. 
The Court of Appeals supports its theory that the letter was a demand by stating 
that "appellant in the letter demands payment in full of appellant's claim and its whole 
tenor is that appellant will not compromise one bit." (Please see the Opinion of the 
Court of Appeals, page 13-14). However, even though the letter contains strong 
language and is indeed demanding, it is nevertheless an offer to compromise or settle for 
an unspecified amount. As pointed out above, the last sentence is critical. It caps off 
the "whole tenor" of the letter by offering to compromise out of court. 
Since the letter was a letter of compromise or settlement, the plaintiffs statement 
that he was ten feet away from the cow is not admissible. In the words of Utah Rule of 
Evidence 408, "[e]vidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is 
likewise not admissible." [emphasis added]. Utah R. Evid. 408. Therefore, this 
statement was erroneously admitted. 
The prejudicial effect of this testimony is obviously great in the present case. A 
person's conduct when confronted by a potentially dangerous animal at a distance of 40 
13 
feet would be different from the reasonable person's conduct at a distance of 10 feet. 
Because appellee's counsel placed this question in the context of whether the animal was 
"cornered", the distance is extremely important. 
In its analysis, the Court of Appeals construes Rule 408 very loosely. The Court 
states in its analysis of the Rule that statements used in settlement negotiations can and 
should be admitted. (Please see the Opinion of the Court of Appeals, page 14.) This 
is contrary to the policy behind rule 408, and if such an interpretation were allowed to 
stand there would be no purpose for the rule. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellate Court's decision in this matter has touched upon three important 
issues in the civil common law: the instruction to the jury regarding the tax 
consequences of personal injury awards; the construction of Rule 704 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence; and the construction of 408 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Appellant contends that the court has departed from the previously announced 
standard and in the case of the Rules of Evidence from the clear text of the Rules. Such 
departure has occurred first by the Court of Appeals correctly holding that the tax 
consequences of a personal injury judgment should not be disclosed to the jury and that 
they should not be instructed regarding such consequences, yet after announcing such 
rule failing to apply the rule in the present case by remanding the matter for a new trial. 
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Second, the Court of Appeals departed from the language of Rule 704 and the practice 
in this jurisdiction of allowing experts to testify to their opinion regarding negligence in 
a personal injury case when such opinion would be a helpful synthesis of the expert's 
testimony. Finally, the court rendered Rule 408 essentially meaningless by allowing the 
defense to offer portions of the letter written by a claimant to an insurance carrier 
demanding a settlement when such letter, even though couched in strong terms, was sent 
solely for the purpose of soliciting a settlement or offer to settle in the matter. 
For these reasons appellant respectfully requests that his petition for certiorari be 
granted and that the Supreme Court of Utah exercise its authority to review the matter. 
DATED AND SIGNED this / ^ J day of July, 1991. 
JE£F£RY C. PEATROSS 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Jeffery C. Peatross, hereby certify that on the/^>May of July, 1991, served 
four (4) copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant, upon H. James Clegg, counsel for 
the appellees in this matter, by mailing to him by first class mail with sufficient postage 
prepaid to the following address: 
H. JAMES CLEGG, Esq. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Attorney of Record 
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ADDENDUM 
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION 
DETERMINATIVE RULES 
A. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59 
B. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 408 
C. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 704 
SETTLEMENT DEMAND LETTER 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Grant Davidson, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
JUN L3 1991 
MM^— 
M*y T. Noonin 
Cbfkaf tht Court 
Utah QQun of Appeals 
Erwin M. Prince and Folkens 
Brothers Trucking, 
Defendants and Appellees 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 900461-CA 
F I L E D 
(June 18, 1991) 
Fourth District, Utah County 
The Honorable Ray M. Harding 
Attorneys: Ray H. Ivie, R. Phil Ivie, and Jeff Peatross, 
Provo, for Appellant 
H. James Clegg and Robert C. Keller, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellees 
Before Judges Billings, Orme, and Russon. 
BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge: 
Appellant Grant Davidson was injured by a cow or a steer 
that had escaped from a wrecked truck driven by Erwin M. 
Prince, an employee of appellee Folkens Brothers Truckinq. 
Subsequently, Davidson filed a negligence action against Prince 
and Folkens. A jury found appellees sixty percent negligent 
and appellant forty percent contributorily negligent. Based on 
this verdict, the judge entered a judgment in favor of 
appellant in the amount of $27,323.88 plus interest. Appellant 
moved for a new trial. The court denied this motion. 
Appellant appeals from the denial of his motion for a new 
trial. We affirm. 
FACTS 
On May 28, 1986, appellee 
animals. Appellee negligently 
was driving a truck containing 
overturned the truck, releasing 
animals onto the highway and into surrounding area. Appellant 
was injured when he was attacked by a steer that had escaped 
from appellee's vehicle. 
At trial, conflicting evidence was introduced regarding 
the proximity of appellant to the steer before the steer 
charged, ranging from forty feet to ten feet. Over appellant's 
objections, appellee's counsel introduced into evidence a 
statement from a letter written to the appellee wherein 
appellant estimated the distance as ten feet. Based on this 
evidence, appellee argued that appellant had cornered the steer 
and was therefore partly responsible for his injuries. 
At trial, the jury awarded appellant total damages in the 
amount of $45,539.80. The jury, however, found appellant forty 
percent at fault and accordingly, appellant was ultimately 
awarded a judgment of only $27,323.88. 
Appellant filed a motion for a new trial, contending the 
trial court had committed three errors of law. First, 
appellant argued the trial court erred in instructing the jury 
regarding the tax consequences of a personal injury judgment. 
Second, appellant contended the trial court erred in precluding 
his expert from testifying that appellee was negligent. Third, 
appellant claimed the trial court erred in admitting a 
statement made in a settlement letter. 
The trial court denied appellant's motion for a new trial, 
concluding that even if error had occurred, it was harmless. 
Appellant appeals this decision, claiming the errors committed 
by the trial court were prejudicial. 
I. JURY INSTRUCTION REGARDING THE TAX CONSEQUENCES 
OF A PERSONAL INJURY JUDGMENT 
The trial court instructed the jury on the tax 
consequences of any award received by appellant as follows: 
"In determining the amount of damages you may not include in, 
or add to an otherwise just award, any sum for the purpose of 
punishing the defendants, or to serve as an example or warning 
for others. In addition you may not include in your award any 
sum for court costs or attorney fees. Neither may any sum of 
money be added to that amount for federal income taxes. I 
charge you as a matter of law, that the amount awarded bv your 
verdict is exempt from federal income taxation." (emphasis 
added). 
Appellant properly objected to the portion of this 
instruction stating that the verdict was exempt from federal 
taxation but his objection was overruled. On appeal, appellant 
contends the trial court erred by instructing the jury that any 
recovery received by appellant would not be subject to federal 
taxation. The propriety of the instructions given to the jury 
is a question of law and we therefore review the trial court's 
instructions for correctness. Knapstad v. Smith's Management 
Corp., 774 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah App. 1989). 
Utah courts have yet to consider the propriety of 
instructing a jury on the tax consequences of a personal injury 
judgment. However, "[t]he majority view in this nation, by 
nearly a five-to-one ratio, is that income tax considerations 
should not be impressed upon a jury." Dehn v. Proutv, 321 
N.W.2d 534, 538 (S.D. 1982). The overwhelming majority of 
state courts which have addressed this issue have held that, 
"as a general rule, it is improper to instruct the jury on the 
tax consequence of a personal injury judgment, and have upheld 
the refusal of trial courts to do so." Annotation, Propriety 
of Taking Income Tax Into Consideration in Fixing Damages in 
Personal Injury or Death Action, 16 A.L.R. 4th 595 (1982).x 
1. For cases condemning such an instruction in the context of 
a personal injury suit, see Combs v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minn. & 
Omaha Rv. Co.. 135 F. Supp. 750 (N.D. Iowa 1955); Mitchell v. 
Emblade, 80 Ariz. 398, 298 P.2d 1034 (1956); W.M. Bashlin Co. 
v. Smith, 277 Ark. 406, 643 S.W.2d 526, 532 (1982); Hildvard v. 
Western Fasteners, Inc., 33 Colo. App. 396, 522 P.2d 596 
(1974); Gorham v. Farmington Motor Inn, Inc., 159 Conn. 576, 
271 A.2d 94, 96 (1970); Kawamoto v. Yasutake, 49 Haw. 42, 410 
P.2d 976 (1966); Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Rv. Co., 5 111. 2d 135, 
125 N.E.2d 77 (1955); Spencer v. Martin K. Ebv Const. Co., 186 
Kan. 345, 350 P.2d 18, 24 (1960); Louisville & Nashville R.R. 
Co. v. Mattingly, 318 S.W.2d 844, 848 (Ky. 1958); Michaud v. 
Steckino, 390 A.2d 524, 535 (Me. 1978); Aaunti v. Pavette, 268 
N.W.2d 52, 55 (Minn. 1978); Amos v. Altenthal, 645 S.W.2d 220 
(Mo. App. 1983); Steinauer v. Sarpy County, 217 Neb. 830, 353 
N.W.2d 715, 726 (1984); Coleman v. New York Transit Auth., 37 
N.Y.2d 137, 332 N.E.2d 850, 855, 371 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1975); 
Andersen v. Teamsters Local 116 Bldg. Club, 347 N.W.2d 309, 314 
(N.D. 1984); Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 
(Tex. 1979); Crum v. Ward, W. Va. 421, 122 S.E.2d 18 (1961); 
Barnette v. Dovle, 622 P.2d 1349, 1367 (Wyo. 1981). 
For cases holding similarly in the context of a wrongful 
death action, see Hansen v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 734 
F.2d 1036, 1045, reh'g denied, 774 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1984), 
cert, denied, 470 U.S. 1051 (1985); Vasina v. Crumman Corp., 
Courts following the majority view have based their 
decisions on varying grounds. Some courts have held that jury 
instructions concerning the tax consequences of a personal 
injury or wrongful death award are improper because they 
(Footnote 1 continued) 
664 F.2d 112, 118 (2d Cir. 1981); Johnson v. Huskev Indus., 
Inc.. 536 F.2d 645, 650 (6th Cir. 1976); Canavin v. Pacific 
S.W. Airlines. 148 Cal. App. 3d 512, 196 Cal. Rptr. 82, 100 
(1983); Richmond Gas. Corp. v. Reeves. 158 Ind. App. 338, 302 
N.E.2d 795 (1973); Kirk v. Ford Motor Co., 147 Mich. App. 337, 
383 N.W.2d 193, 198 (1985); Scallon v. Hooper, 293 S.E.2d 843, 
845, petition denied, 295 S.E.2d 843 (N.C. 1982); Terveer v. 
Baschnaoel, 3 Ohio App. 3d 312, 445 N.E.2d 264 (1982); Green v. 
Dennev, 87 Or. App. 298, 742 P.2d 639 (1987); Rivera v. 
Philadelphia Theological Seminary, 326 Pa. Super. 509, 474 A.2d 
605, 617 (1984); Stallcup v. Tavlor, 62 Tenn. App. 407, 463 
S.W.2d 416 (1971). 
For additional cases holding similarly in both contexts, 
see Annotation, Propriety of Taking Income Tax Into 
Consideration in Fixing Damages in Personal Injury or Death 
Action. 16 A.L.R. 4th 595 (1982 & Supp. 1990). 
Nevertheless, in Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 
490 (1980), the United States Supreme Court held that in a 
wrongful death action brought under the Federal Employer's 
Liability Act (FELA), the trial court erred in excluding 
evidence offered by the defendant to.show the effect of income 
taxes on the decedent's estimated future earnings and in 
refusing to instruct the jury that their award to the plaintiff 
would not be subject to income tax. 
Despite the Supreme Court's holding, most state courts 
addressing the taxation instruction issue subsequent to the 
Lieoelt decision have maintained their prior position that it 
is improper to instruct the jury regarding the tax consequences 
of a personal injury or wrongful death award under state law 
limiting Liepelt to FELA cases. See, e.g., Canavin v. Pacific 
S.W. Airlines. 148 Cal. App. 3d 512, 196 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1983); 
Barnette v. Dovle, 622 P.2d 1349 (1981); Dehn, 321 N.W.2d at 
538 (noting that Liepelt "dealt solely with federal law . . . 
as applied to a wrongful death action and has been generally 
limited to the particular facts arising thereunder"); Klawonn 
v. Mitchell. 105 111. 2d 450, 475 N.E.2d 857, 860 (1985) 
("Although Liepelt has established that in FELA actions, 
juries, upon request, must be instructed that any damages 
awarded are not subject to taxation, this case involves purely 
State law, and Liepelt is not directly controlling."). 
interject a collateral and irrelevant matter. See, e.g., Dehn, 
321 N.W.2d at 539 ("income tax liability is a matter foreign to 
the award of damages in that it is not a pertinent issue 
bearing on the award thereof"); Mitchell v. Emblade. 80 Ariz. 
398, 298 P.2d 1034 (1956) (holding that taxability of award is 
collateral to the calculation of damages). According to these 
courts, if a jury were instructed regarding the tax 
consequences of a personal injury or wrongful death judgment, 
other cautionary instructions would also be required on other 
collateral matters which might affect the amount of damages 
awarded by a jury, such as the fact the injured party will have 
to pay attorney fees out of the judgment. See Dehn, 321 N.W.2d 
at 539, As noted by the Emblade court, if a jury is instructed 
on the tax consequences of an award, 
what objection can there be for 
plaintiff's counsel to state that the 
expense of trial is not provided for in 
the instruction concerning damages, that 
the cost of medical witnesses is not paid 
by the defendant, that the expense of 
taking depositions, as well as court 
reporting at the trial, must be borne by 
the individual litigants, that the fees of 
plaintiff's attorney are not recognized as 
an element, [and] that the defendant can 
deduct any award it pays from its income 
and excess profits tax return. 
Emblade, 298 P.2d at 1037-38.2 
Other courts aligning themselves with the majority have 
done so to prevent unnecessary complication of trials. See, 
e.g., Scallon v. Hooper, 58 N.C. App. 551, 293 S.E.2d 843, 845 
("consideration of the taxation issue . . . would ordinarily 
involve abundant and intricate evidence and jury instructions 
on present and future tax and nontax liabilities") review 
denied, 306 N.C. 744, 295 S.E.2d 843 (1982); Emblade, 298 P.2d 
2. Indeed, as noted by Justice Blackmun, "[i]t is also 
'entirely possible* that the jury 'may* increase its damages 
award in the belief that the defendant is insured, or that the 
plaintiff will be obligated for substantial attorney's fees, or 
that the award is subject to state (as well as federal) income 
tax, or on the basis of any number of other extraneous 
factors." Liepelt, 444 U.S. at 503 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
at 1038 (noting that interjecting this issue into the 
calculation of damages would unduly "complicate the trial by 
requiring an intricate discussion of tax and nontax 
liabilities"); Combs v. Chicago St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha 
Ry. Co,, 135 F. Supp. 750, 757 (N.D. Iowa 1955) (noting that 
interjecting this issue into the calculation of damages "would 
probably give rise to more problems than it would solve"); 
Klawonn v. Mitchell, 105 111. 2d 450, 475 N.E.2d 897, 861 
(1985) ("proof of pecuniary loss, not simple under the best of 
circumstances, should not be rendered more complex by injecting 
the question of income tax or other extraneous factors"). 
Courts adopting the majority position also note that there 
is no evidence that juries increase damage awards because of a 
belief that such awards are taxable. See, e.g., Dehn, 321 
N.W.2d at 538 (noting that there is "no evidence . . . or 
empirical data demonstrating that . . . juries in general 
regularly increase damage awards because of a mistaken belief 
that the state and federal governments share in the award 
through income taxes"); Klawonn, 475 N.E.2d at 860 (quoting 
Norfolk & W. Rv. Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 503 (1980) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting)) ("'[t]here certainly is no evidence 
in this record to indicate that the jury is any more likely to 
act upon an erroneous assumption about any other collateral 
matter1"). 
A fourth reason given by courts which have adopted the 
majority position is that the taxability of the award is an 
issue which concerns only the recipient of the award and the 
Internal Revenue Service. See, e.g., Eriksen v. Bover, 225 
N.W.2d 66, 74 (N.D. 1974) (quoting Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Rv. 
Co., 5 111. 2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77, 86 (1955)) ("whether the 
plaintiff has to pay a tax on the award is a matter that 
concerns only the plaintiff and the government1"). As noted by 
3. In a wrongful death action, the finder of fact must 
consider the probable future income of the deceased in order to 
accurately calculate the plaintiff's damages. In contrast, 
calculation of damages in a personal injury action usually will 
not involve the future income of the plaintiff to the same 
extent. Introducing the issue of the tax consequences of a 
damage award, therefore, likely will complicate matters more in 
a wrongful death action than in a personal injury suit. The 
majority of jurisdictions addressing this issue, however, have 
applied one uniform standard to both types of cases, refusing 
to create two separate rules. We believe this is the sound 
approach. 
the Eriksen court, "'if the jury were to mitigate the damages 
of the plaintiff by reason of the income tax exemption accorded 
him, then the very Congressional intent of the income tax law 
to give an injured party a tax benefit would be nullified.'" 
Id. 
Finally, some courts have rejected jury consideration of 
income tax consequences because such instructions are too 
conjectural and speculative. See, e.g., Canavin v. Pacific 
S.W. Airlines, 148 Cal. App. 3d 512, 541, 196 Cal. Rptr. 82, 
102 (1983) ("Income tax instructions are conjectural and open 
the door to intense speculation."); Scallon, 293 S.E.2d at 845 
("The reason courts adopt the majority view of refusing to take 
income tax consequences into consideration in awarding damages 
for wrongful death is that the amount of a recipient's future 
income tax liability is too conjectural or speculative a 
factor."). 
We are persuaded by the aforestated arguments supporting 
the exclusion of an instruction in a personal injury or 
wrongful death action informing the jury that the judgment will 
not be subject to taxation. We, therefore, adopt the majority 
view that it is improper to instruct the jury as to the tax 
consequences of a personal injury or wrongful death award. We 
do so, however, cognizant of the fact that most courts 
addressing this issue have done so in the context of deciding 
whether it was error for the trial court to refuse to give an 
income tax instruction. Most trial judges have exercised their 
discretion to exclude such instructions. 
In the instant case, the trial court gave the requested 
tax instruction. Thus, we are faced with a different issue; 
did the trial court commit reversible error by instructing the 
jury as to the tax consequences of the plaintiff's award? Few 
courts have directly addressed this issue. The courts that 
have addressed the prejudice resulting from an income tax 
instruction have done so in the context of wrongful death 
actions and have held that "it is reversible error for the 
trial court to instruct the jury that damages awarded . . . are 
exempt from federal and state income taxes." Scallon, 293 
S.E.2d at 845 (emphasis added); see also Klawonn, 475 N.W.2d at 
857 (holding that instructing the jury that wrongful death 
award was not subject to taxation was reversible error). 
Under Utah law, an improper jury instruction is grounds 
for "reversible error 'if it tends to mislead the jury to the 
prejudice of the complaining party.'" Knapstad v. Smith's 
r » n n i /• i •-•»•* 
Management Corp., 774 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah App. 1989) (citations 
omitted). Where a jury is instructed on the tax consequences 
of a damage award, the effect of such instructions on the 
jury's ultimate damage award is extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, to determine. This in some ways supports a per se 
reversible error prophylactic rule. However, in the case 
before us, although the court did improperly instruct the jury 
as to the tax consequences of the judgment, this error was 
mitigated by the context in which the information was 
presented. The instruction at issue not only informed the jury 
about the tax consequences of the judgment, but also admonished 
the jury not to consider other collateral matters such as 
punishment or attorney fees. In fact, the first part of the 
instruction referring to taxes merely informed the jurors not 
to add any amount for the payment of taxes. In context, we 
cannot say that the objectionable portion of the instruction 
was likely to have affected the amount of damages awarded. 
However, we caution that an instruction as to the tax 
consequences of a judgment should not be given by trial judges 
as our conclusion concerning the prejudicial impact of such an 
instruction could be different in other factual contexts. 
II. PRECLUSION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 
During the presentation of appellant's case in chief, Mr. 
Newell Knight, an accident reconstruction expert, was called to 
testify regarding appellee's negligence. Counsel for appellant 
asked Mr. Knight if he had an opinion regarding whether 
appellee was negligent. Mr. Knight responded affirmatively. 
When Mr. Knight was asked to express his opinion, counsel for 
appellee objected on the ground that the question pertained to 
an ultimate issue to be decided by the jury. The trial court 
sustained appellee's objection. On appeal, appellant argues 
the trial court committed prejudicial error by excluding Mr. 
Knight's testimony because such opinion testimony is expressly 
allowed under Utah Rule of Evidence 704. 
4. We realistically note that juries often speculate as to 
collateral matters such as whether the plaintiff will have to 
pay attorney fees, costs and taxes from the judgment, as well 
as whether insurance will cover some portion of the damages. 
It may be useful to explicitly caution the jury not to 
speculate on any of these collateral matters, but only to 
decide the question of damages with reference to the evidence 
before them and the court's instructions. 
In reviewing the admissibility of evidence at trial, we 
give deference to the trial court's advantageous position, and 
do not overturn the result unless it is clear the trial court 
erred. See Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 
920, 923 (Utah 1990); S££ also State v. Kinsev, 797 P.2d 424, 
427 (Utah App.) ("It is generally held that the trial court has 
discretion to determine the suitability of expert testimony in 
a case."), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990). 
Traditionally, an expert was not allowed to offer an 
opinion on an ultimate issue to be decided by the jury. See, 
g.gt/ Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 
1967). Expert testimony regarding ultimate issues, however, is 
now admissible under Utah Rule of Evidence 704.5 This rule 
reads: "Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference 
otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces 
an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." Utah R. 
Evid. 704.6 
The trial court's exclusion of this testimony, however, 
can be affirmed on the ground that it was a legal conclusion. 
Although Rule 704 abolishes the per se rule against testimony 
regarding ultimate issues of fact, it does not allow all 
opinions. 'fThe Advisory Committee notes [to Rule 704] make it 
clear that questions which would merely allow the witness to 
tell the jury what result to reach are not permitted. Nor is 
the rule intended to allow a witness to give legal conclusions." 
5. This rule follows Federal Rule of Evidence 704 verbatim. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "since the advisory 
committee generally sought to achieve uniformity between Utah's 
rules and the federal rules, [the Utah Supreme Court] looks to 
the interpretations of the federal rules by the federal courts 
to aid in interpreting the Utah rules." State v. Gray, 717 
P.2d 1313, 1317 (Utah 1986). Accordingly, this court may look 
to federal law interpreting Federal Rule of Evidence 704 to aid 
in the interpretation of Utah Rule of Evidence 704. 
6. Sfifi also Gaw v. State, 798 P.2d 1130 (Utah App. 1990) 
(noting that Utah Rule of Evidence 704 allows an expert to 
express opinion concerning ultimate issue in the case); 11 J. 
Moore & H. Bendix, Moore's Federal Practice § 704.10, at VII-64 
(1989) ("Under rule 704, testimony of both lay and expert 
witnesses in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise 
admissible is not objectionable because it 'embraces an 
ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.'"). 
n n r\ A c i r*?\ r\ 
Owen v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 698 F.2d 236, 240 (5th Cir. 1983). 
Thus, an expert generally cannot give an opinion as to whether 
an individual was "negligent" because such an opinion would 
require a legal conclusion. See, e.q., Shahid v. Citv of 
Detroit, 889 F.2d 1543 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that expert 
testimony was not admissible on ultimate legal conclusion of 
whether correctional officers were negligent in failing to 
provide necessary medical treatment to inmate); see also Specht 
v. Jensen, 853 F.2d 805, 808-09 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that 
allowing legal expert to testify as to whether there had been a 
"search" in plaintiff's residence constituted reversible error; 
summarizing cases in which the second, fourth, fifth and sixth 
circuits held that expert witnesses may not give legal 
conclusions); Hoqan v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 812 F.2d 409 
(8th Cir. 1987) ("Opinion testimony is not helpful to the 
factfinder if it is couched as a legal conclusion."); Smith v. 
Atlantic Richfield Co, 814 F.2d 1481, 1485 (10th Cir. 1987) 
(upholding trial court's exclusion of expert's opinion as to 
whether defendant's actions were "prudent mine practices" on 
the grounds that the question called for a legal conclusion). 
There is no bright line between permissible questions 
under Rule 704 and those that call for overbroad legal 
responses. Here, however, the intended response when placed in 
context was an inadmissible one. Mr. Knight was allowed to 
give his opinion as to, inter alia, the reason appellee's truck 
overturned while going around a curve, that the truck was 
traveling too fast for the curve, what the speed limit was at 
the curve, whether a person hauling livestock should be 
concerned with his load and what the concerns should be, and 
whether a person hauling livestock could foresee the 
possibility of injury if the truck overturned. Indeed, the 
only evidence the trial court excluded was Knight's conclusion 
regarding whether appellee was negligent. Additionally, 
Knight's testimony was not technical or difficult to 
understand, but was expressed in lay terms. The trial judge 
did not err in excluding Mr. Knight's opinion testimony that 
appellee was negligent. The excluded testimony was an answer 
to a specific question which would appear on the verdict form, 
a question which must be answered based upon the judge's 
definition of a legal term "negligence." Questions which allow 
a witness to simply tell the jury what result to reach are not 
permitted. 
Given that Knight's testimony was easily understandable 
and that Knight was allowed to testify as to everything except 
his final conclusion that appellee was negligent, the testimony 
was properly excluded as the jury was capable of drawing its 
own conclusions from the evidence presented and after 
instruction from the court. 
III. ADMISSION OF STATEMENT IN "SETTLEMENT" LETTER 
Finally, appellant contends the trial court erred in 
allowing into evidence statements he made in a letter to 
appellee. Appellee's theory at trial was that appellant was 
negligent in cornering the steer which had escaped from 
appellee's truck. In support of this theory, appellee 
emphasized the distance between appellant and the animal at the 
time the animal charged. As noted earlier, appellant in 
deposition testimony estimated the distance to be approximately 
forty feet. Additional evidence was presented at trial that 
the distance may have been approximately twenty-two feet. At 
trial, appellee's counsel introduced a statement from a letter 
written to appellee wherein appellant estimated the distance at 
ten feet, a distance which tended to support appellee's 
theory. Appellant claims the trial court erred in admitting 
this statement because it was made as part of settlement 
negotiations. 
The admissibility of settlement negotiations is governed 
by Utah Rule of Evidence 408 which states: 
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or 
promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or 
offering or promising to accept, a 
7. Furthermore, Rule 704 must be read in conjunction with the 
other rules of evidence. Thus, 
while [Rule 704] permits expert opinion 
testimony on an ultimate issue, Rule 704 
does not mean that all opinions are 
admissible into evidence. Rules 701 and 
702 require, respectively, that the 
opinions of lay and expert witnesses 
assist the trier of fact. And Rule 403 
provides for the exclusion of evidence 
which wastes time. Thus, if a witness's 
opinion will do little more than tell the 
jury what result to reach, it will be 
inadmissible. 
10 J. Moore & H. Bendix, Moore's Federal Practice § 704.02, at 
VII-63 (1989). 
valuable consideration in compromising or 
attempting to compromise a claim which was 
disputed as to either validity or amount, 
is not admissible to prove liability for 
or invalidity of the claim or its amount. 
Evidence of conduct or statements made in 
compromise negotiations is likewise not 
admissible. This rule does not require 
the exclusion of any evidence otherwise 
discoverable merely because it is 
presented in the course of compromise 
negotiations. This rule also does not 
require exclusion when evidence is offered 
for another purpose, such as proving bias 
or prejudice of a witness, negativing a 
contention of undue delay, or proving an 
effort to obstruct a criminal 
investigation or prosecution. 
Utah R. Evid. 408. This rule follows verbatim Federal Rule of 
Evidence 408 which was used as a model in drafting the Utah 
Rules. See Fed. R. Evid. 408. Accordingly, this court looks 
to federal law interpreting Federal Rule of Evidence 408 to 
define the contours of Utah Rule of Evidence 408. See Gray, 
717 P.2d at 1317; see also note 5, supra. 
"In order for the exclusionary rule to attach, the party 
seeking to have evidence of offers to compromise or statements 
made in the course thereof excluded must show that the 
discussions in question were made in 'compromise 
negotiations.'" 10 J. Moore & H. Bendix, Moore's Federal 
Practice § 408.04 (1988 & Supp. 1990). 
The letter in question, from appellant and his wife to 
appellee, begins by reviewing the factual circumstances of the 
accident8 and it is in this factual recitation that appellant 
8. This portion of the letter reads: 
It appears you have been poorly 
informed as to Mr. Grant Davidson's injury 
claim. 
Please allow us to clarify: Mr. 
Davidson while performing his job for the 
D & RGW Railroad, saw the injured cow 
sitting on the railroad. He stopped and 
got out some 10 feet from the animal. He 
made no move towards the injured cow but 
while standing still was charged. He fled 
admits "he stopped and got out some 10 feet from the animal." 
Following this recitation of facts, the letter continues by 
stating, "[w]e don't intend to let you or that trucking company 
off, with a letter telling us that your [sic] not 
responsible-" In conclusion, appellant's letter states, "[y]ou 
may speak with us directly or we can send it to lawyers and to 
court, you decide." 
We believe the trial judge was correct in admitting the 
statement from the letter sent by appellant to appellee because 
the letter was not an offer to compromise appellant's claim, 
nor was it written as part of settlement negotiations. To the 
contrary, this letter is merely an attempt to inform appellee 
as to the facts of the incident. Furthermore, appellant in the 
(Footnote 8 continued) 
the cow, but it caught him, goring him in 
the back and sending him air born for 
approximately 20 feet where he landed on 
the rail on his knee. 
The attack continued with the cow 
attempting to trample Mr. Davidson to 
death, as he lay stunned with a concussion 
on the ground he pushed the animal off and 
escaped to the safety of a rail car. 
The cow continued to charge repeatedly 
and finally moved off. It then charged 
many others before it was killed. 
Mr. Davidson did not pursue, chase or 
attempt to move the cow. As it (the cow) 
was injured in the accident, it became 
abnormally dangerous. 
We have been advised by legal counsel 
that the contents of a truck, when they 
spill and are dangerous (as this case) are 
the responsibility of the insurer when 
those dangerous contents injure innocent 
people. 
Mr. Davidson has a permanent knee 
problem, and must wear a brace while doing 
any work. He's had 16 years with this 
job, which is now jeopardized by this 
injury. He has lost wages, has great 
suffering and now is going to be disabled 
the rest of his life. 
letter demands 
whole tenor is 
payment in full of appellant's claim and its 
that appellant will not compromise one bit. 
9. Even if appellant's letter was construed to be a statement 
made in settlement negotiations, courts construing Federal Rule 
of Evidence 408 and similar state rules have held that evidence 
of statements made in settlement negotiations can and should be 
admitted for purposes of impeachment. For example, in United 
States Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. Olvmpia Wings, Inc., 89 6 
F.2d 949 (5th Cir. 1990), the court held that the trial court 
had properly acted within its discretion under Rule 408 when it 
admitted evidence of a settlement that was offered to impeach 
the plaintiff's earlier deposition testimony. In so holding, 
the court stated that Federal Rule of Evidence 408 "permits 
settlement evidence for any purpose except to prove or disprove 
liability or the amount of the claim. Ld. at 956 (citing 
Belton v. Fibreboard, 724 F.2d 500, 505 (5th Cir. 1984)). 
Similarly, in County of Hennepin v. AFG Indus., Inc., 726 F.2d 
149 (8th Cir. 1984), the court allowed evidence of a settlement 
to impeach. The court stated that although Rule 408 excludes 
evidence of a settlement to prove liability, it "'does not 
require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another 
purpose, such as proving the bias or prejudice of a witness 
. . . ,'
M
 adding that "[t]he Rule codifies a trend in case law 
that permits evidence of a settlement to impeach." id- at 
152-53 (citing Reichenbach v. Smith, 528 F.2d 1072, 1075 (5th 
Cir. 1976)). Furthermore, in Slusher v. Ospital, 777 P.2d 437 
(Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court stated, albeit in dicta, 
that under Utah Rule of Evidence 408, evidence of compromise is 
admissible for impeachment purposes. In Slusher, the court was 
considering the effect of two statutes which were superseded by 
the Utah Rules of Evidence, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-29 and -30 
(1977). The court stated that "[t]aken together, the two 
statutes resulted in a rule not unlike Utah Rule of Evidence 
408, now in effect. In other words, they precluded 
introduction of the settlement for the purpose of establishing 
liability but not for the purposes relating to credibility." 
Id. at 443 (emphasis added); see also id. n.12 (in which the 
court stated that if Rule 408 applied to the trial in Slusher, 
"it even more clearly supports the conclusion we reach [that 
evidence of compromise should be allowed for impeachment 
purposes]."). 
Thus, even if appellant's letter to appellee were to be 
construed to have been made as part of settlement discussions, 
it could be admitted to impeach appellant's prior testimony 
regarding the distance between himself and the steer prior to 
the accident. 
In sum, we conclude that the trial judge did not err in 
excluding appellant's expert testimony that appellee was 
negligent. Such testimony was a legal conclusion and did not 
assist the trier of fact and, therefore, was properly 
excluded. Additionally, the trial judge did nor err in 
admitting a statement in which appellant estimated that the 
distance between himself and the steer prior to the accident 
was ten feet. The statement was not made in the course of 
settlement negotiations. Finally, although we conclude the 
trial judge erred by instructing the jury regarding the tax 
consequences of the plaintiff's award, we find the error 
Accordingly, we affirm. 
£ 
Judith M. Billings, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
I CONCUR 
Gregory^. Orme, Judge 
I CONCUR IN PARTS II AND III AND IN THE RESULT ONLY IN PART I: 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
Rule 59 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be 
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of 
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an 
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of 
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, 
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors 
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a 
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a 
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be 
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have 
guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making t!ie ap-
plication, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered 
and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, 
or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later 
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is 
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affida-
vit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be 
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service 
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affida-
vits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional 
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by 
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment 
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it 
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall 
specify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment A motion to alter or amend the 
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Juror's competency as witness as to validity 
Rule 59. F Ju 1JP. of verdict or indictment, Rules of E i« ence, 
Cross-Refe «ncea. — Fee for filing motion Rule 606. 
Un -IWF ' lai, * 21-2-2. 
HanHe** **or not ground for new trial, 
H ie 6' 
Rule 408. Compromise and offers to compromise. 
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accept-
ing or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromis-
ing or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either 
validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the 
claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise 
negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does not require the exclu-
sion of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in 
the course of compromise negotiations. This rule also does not require exclu-
sion when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or 
prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an 
effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution. 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is 
the federal rule, verbatim, and is comparable 
to Rules 52 and 53, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971) but is broader to the extent that it ex-
cludes statements made in the course of negoti-
ations. 
ANALYSIS 
Settlement agreement. 
Cited. 
Settlement agreement 
When an injured plaintiff and one or more, 
but not ail, defendant tortfeasors enter into a 
settlement agreement, the parties must 
promptly inform the court and the other par-
ties to the action of the existence of the agree-
ment and of its terms. If the action is tried by a 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence 
§ 629 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 31A CJ.S. Evidence § 285. 
A.L.R. — Admissibility of admissions made 
in connection with offers or discussions of com-
promise, 15 A.L.R.3d 13. 
Cross-References. — Offer of judgment, 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 68. 
Release or settlement of personal injury 
claim, rescission or disavowal of, § 78-27-32. 
jury, the court shall, upon motion of a party, 
disclose the existence and basic content of the 
agreement to the jury unless the court finds 
that, on facts particular to the case, such dis-
closure will create substantial danger of undue 
e, prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of mis-
a leading the jury. Slusher v. Ospital, 111 Utah 
st Adv. Rep. 18 (1989). 
&. Cited in Hector, Inc. v. United Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n, 741 P.2d 542 (Utah 1987). 
Admissibility of evidence showing payment, 
or offer or promise of payment, of medical, hos-
pital, and similar expenses of injured party by 
opposing party, 65 A.L.R.3d 932. 
Key Numbers. — Evidence *» 213. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Rule 704. Opinion on ultimate issue. 
Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not 
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier 
of fact. 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is Edwards v. Didericksen, 597 P.2d 1328 (Utah 
the federal rule, verbatim, and comports with 1979). 
Rule 56(4), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). See 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS opinion is admissible as to an ultimate issue. 
Edwards v. Didericksen, 597 P.2d 1328 (Utah 
In general. 1979) (referred to in Advisory Committee 
Cited. Note). 
Opinion testimony of expert witness was not 
In general. rendered inadmissible by fact that it may have 
The expertise of the witness, his degree of embraced the ultimate factual issue to be de-
familiarity with the necessary facts, and the cided by the jury. Shurtleff v. Jay Tuft & Co., 
logical nexus between his opinion and the facts 622 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1980). 
adduced must be established before an expert's Cited in Shurtleff v. Jay Tuft & Co., 622 
P.2d 1168 (Utah 1980); American Concept Ins. 
Co. v. Lochhead, 751 P.2d 271 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Com- tutional Implications, 15 J. Contemp. L. 81 
ment, Victims of Child Sexual Abuse in the (1989). 
Courtroom: New Utah Rules and Their Consti-
October 1, 1987 
To whom xt may concern 
Re; injury claim 
Gentlemen: 
It appears you have been poorly informed as t o Mr. Grant 
Davidson's injury claim. 
P lease allow us t o c la ir i fy: Mr. Davidson while performing 
his job for the D & RGW Railroad,, saw the injured cow s i t t i n g on 
the railroad. He stopped and got: out some 10 f e e t from the 
animal. He made no move towards the injured cow but while 
standing s t i l l was charged. He fled the cow, but i t caught him, 
goreing him in the back :*nd sending him air born for 
approximately 20 f e e t whtre he landed on the rai l en his knee. 
The at tack continued with the cow attempting t o trample 
Mr. Davidson t o death, as he lay stunned with a concussion on the 
ground he pushed the animal off and escaped to the s a f e t y of a 
rai l car . 
The cow continued t o charge repeatedly and f inally moved 
off. It then charged nany o thers before i t was kiPed. 
Mr. Davidson did not persue , chase or attempt t o move the 
cow. As i t (the cow) was injured in the accident, i t became 
abnormally dangerous. 
We have been advised by l ega l counse l that the c o n t e n t s of a 
truck, when they sp i l l and are dangerous (as th is c a s e ) . Are the 
re spons ib i l i ty of the insurer when t h o s e dangerous c o n t e n t s 
injure innocent people. 
Mr. Davidson has a permenato knee problem, and must wear a 
brace while doing any work. He's had 16 years with t h i s job, 
which i s now jepordized by th i s injury. He has l o s t wages , has 
g r e a t suffer ing and now is going 1:o be disabled the r e s t of his 
l i f e . 
We don't intend t o ±e.t you or t h a t trucking company off, with a 
l e t t e r t e l l ing us t h a t your not responsible . 
P<~ge Two 
ac-ptember 29, 1987 
You may speak with us 
and to cour t , you decide. 
d i rec t ly cr we can send i t to lawyers 
Very s incerely, 
Grant S. Davidson 
Sandy J. Davidson 
